Manfred Halpern

The Morality and Politics of Intervention

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

by Manfred Halpern

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FOREWORD

During the past several years the Council on Religion and International Affairs has published a number of pamphlets on the general theme "Ethics and Foreign Policy." This series of essays represents no single point of view; it is, in fact, expressly designed to draw upon the various great traditions, moral and political, which are our common heritage. The essays are united, however, in their essential concern, for each attempts to relate religious and moral insight to contemporary events so that the possibilities of an ordered justice may be more nearly perceived.

In his essay, Manfred Halpern considers an issue which is a grave and current national concern: American intervention in the internal affairs of other states. Although this paper was written before recent dramatic illustrations of such intervention — the Cuban blockade, the war in Vietnam, the Arab-Israeli war — the principles here enunciated are directly relevant to these events and to the continuing discussions which have ensued. The Council is pleased to offer, in Mr. Halpern's essay, what it regards as a distinguished contribution to that discussion. In this, the fifth edition of his essay, Mr. Halpern has made some few changes from the original version.

Manfred Halpern since 1958 has been Associate Professor of Politics at Princeton University, and a staff member of Princeton's Program in Near Eastern Studies and the Center of International Studies. During the preceding ten years, he worked in the Department of State in Washington where he was Special Assistant to the Chief, Division of Research and Analysis for Near East, South Asia, and Africa. In 1952, he received the State Department's Meritorious Service Award. He has been a consultant to the RAND Corporation since 1958 and is the author of *The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa.*

James Finn
Director of Publications
The Council on Religion
and International Affairs

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Intervention Redefined[1]

It is not inevitable that men should ask whether it is moral to intervene in the internal affairs of other nations. To some, it has obviously become a mere question of posture—how to keep a straight face while intervening, how to smile piously when discovered, and how to win converts during the moral upsurge that should accompany the exposure of others in the great game of intervention. Some are convinced that the Communist world represents a menace so evil that any action against this threat, as long as it is successful, is by definition moral, or else merely a problem of techniques.

If the question of morality is evaded by the technicians of power and the secular crusaders, the meaning of intervention is often obscured by traditional preconceptions. Only at first glance does "intervention" seem an obviously identifiable act carrying obvious consequences. In a world built upon national sovereignties and jurisdictions and the equality of independent states, any state that intervenes in the internal affairs of another undermines the institutional and legal foundations on which its own existence rests. This is a truth of great consequences to which we shall have to return. But it is not the only truth. Intervention, which by its nature subverts the foundations of the existing international system, takes place in a system which is by its nature fundamentally unstable. States in fact are not equal: nations can exploit the rules and opportunities of the present international system to enlarge their power over others and so risk death on a vast scale. We live at a time when intervention, by subverting the sovereignty of national independence, may further undermine the only rules of the game that now maintain order, yet when only intervention may be able to restore the free operation of these rules, save freedom in a nation or, indeed, help to create a more secure and more freely interdependent world order. In our world, intervention can be moral or immoral, or simultaneously illegal and justifiable. The morality of intervention is determined both by the principles it creates or destroys and by the contingencies of circumstances. Intervention therefore involves a realm of morality in which a discussion of principles is essential but in which no discussion of principles has relevance for the next act of intervention or nonintervention until the circumstances surrounding that act have also been discussed.

It is an illustration of the unstable character of the present international system that there is no agreement on the definition of the two acts most likely to destroy the sovereignty, independence and equality of any participant of the system, or perhaps even the system itself—namely, aggression and intervention. That is not to say that there is no agreement whatever. There is enough agreement to make the system endure; not sufficient agreement to make it stable. Nonetheless, to say that intervention is interference (falling short of aggressively crossing the frontiers with military force) in the internal affairs of another sovereign state is almost to obscure the question. We live, more now than ever, in an interdependent world. Almost everything that a powerful nation does (or almost everything that a weak nation, like the Congo, is powerless to do) vitally affects the internal affairs of many other nations.

A great power intervenes in the domestic realm of other states when it says yes and when it says no; indeed by its sheer existence. By our very model of life we set an example for the Russians which stings Khrushchev to competition and not a few of his citizens to an emulation subversive of the official ideal of Bolshevik Man, even if not directly of the Soviet government. We intervene when we say no to the Aswan Dam, without which Egypt's standard of poverty would further deteriorate; we intervene correspondingly when we say yes to the Volta Dam in Ghana.[2]

It has been said that if the American economy sneezes, the world's economy, and especially countries depending on the export of a single raw material, catch pneumonia. A socialist is entitled to say that deliberate nonintervention by governments in their own richer and more powerful domestic economies may cause as much suffering, not only at home but abroad, as the deliberate exploitation of poorer and weaker foreign economies. The capitalist recognizes the potency of such economic intervention in the affairs of other sovereign states both when he opposes and when he supports selective foreign aid. Intentions alone do not keep actions from being interventionist. The Western democracies' intention not to intervene in the Spanish Civil War was one of the crucial factors intervening in favor of General Franco's victory.

Intervention may include propaganda, espionage, discriminatory economic policies, assistance to legitimate governments in their domestic tasks[3] no less than aid to subversive movements, and support or denial of support to governments or their opposition in domestic crises where such foreign support might prove to be decisive. There is no validity in confining the term only to those actions which the *legitimate* govern-

ment of the country considers to be intervention. In an age of social and colonial revolutions, any prudent government will be as sensitive to the reactions of the future rulers of Angola or Iran to intervention and its consequences as to the reactions of the present ruling regimes. In trying to distinguish intervention from other actions that have consequences across frontiers, one can only set outer limits: intervention is any action, beginning with deliberate or remediable interaction among nations, that significantly affects the public internal realm of another sovereign state and which stops short of aggressive crossing of international frontiers.[4] Intervention is action along a continuum of possible choices. The range of alternative courses once men have decided to intervene (or indeed, not to intervene) is far greater than is usually thought of when men debate intervention. Our political and moral responsibility in the realm of intervention is therefore far greater than we usually assume.

Several objections may be raised against so broad a definition of intervention. Certainly it would not be helpful for USIA to speak of such constructive American policies as the application of the Truman Doctrine in Greece and Turkey, or our successful efforts to deter the French from deposing in 1951 the nationalist-minded King of the then French Protectorate of Morocco, as a policy of intervention. To refer to American policy publicly as a "diplomacy of involvement" may be no less accurate, but more agreeable, reserving the harder word "intervention" to describe the actions of unfriendly nations. In the present clinical discussion, a single term is more fitting for describing this singular form of national behavior.

A more profound and substantive objection may be raised, namely that giving such wide compass to the meaning of intervention will tend to undermine precious distinctions between coercion and persuasion in international diplomacy. These distinctions are vital, but they do not take the simple form often ascribed to them. No serious great power tries to persuade another nation unless it means to convince. Whether it wins its case or strikes a bargain depends not merely on the soundness of its arguments but also on the coercive weight of power that each interested nation experienced or wished to avoid experiencing. In international affairs, coercion begins at the moment of persuasion. There is only one important exception, namely where two nations have agreed on overlapping national interests in a situation in which one nation is not invidiously dependent on the other. In all other cases the crucial distinction in international relations does not lie in the separation of power and persuasion, but in the difference among the means and ends of power and persuasion—or among types of interven-

tion (discussed below). It still makes a considerable difference whether the coercive component in intervention is assassination and terror or whether it is a deliberate reduction in economic aid. Men who in the present world order are inclined to draw a fundamental contrast between persuasion and coercion in international affairs tend to become either impotent idealists or else seeming realists who hand over to the technicians of power any problem not yet solved by discussion. Those who know that persuasion and coercion are inseparable in the uses of authority may require experts in covert activities and armed combat, but they have no need for men who specialize in power, or else in morality.

The Relevance of Morality to Intervention

At this point, some may be ready to respond to the complex interrelationship of power and morality by relaxing into moral ambiguities or, which is the same thing, platitudes. Others may be content to trust instead to individual moral leadership, forgetting that the same man who rightly would not read another individual's mail must find standards by which we would enthusiastically break another nation's code. A man who would not hesitate physically and immediately to avenge an insult to his wife's honor may not act with similar assurance when a hundred million dead become the price of avenging a nation's honor.

Complexity must not deter us. The need for wisdom has grown: intervention is likely to become more common than ever before precisely as we succeed, through military technology, in making gains through outright aggression less probable, even while the conflict between ourselves and expansionist Communism remains unresolved. Under these terms also, the danger of uncontrolled intervention escalating into unintended but destructive aggression rises—but so also rises the price of nonintervention whenever Communist nations are already intervening. The greater our power and our responsibility, the greater the need also to find a valid and moral code for our actions in history.

There is no obvious synthesis between morality and intervention. It is a cruel simplicity that makes a virtue of necessity or a necessity of virtue. To balance the demands of morality against the demands of victory in order to strike a mere compromise is almost bound to frustrate action and damage morality. Nor is morality merely an added decoration or only an ultimate grace: morality, especially when it serves to strengthen lawful stability or stabilizing change, has obvious practical consequences. These we ignore at our peril whenever we are tempted to gain only the practical results of power, and imitate the tactics of conflict management developed by Communists or sometimes attributed

to them by our our own secular crusaders who compliment Communists beyond reason by believing them to be omnipotent and omnipresent in conspiracy and subversion. Surely the problem deserves to be resolved in terms of choices based on our own values of world order.

Nothing is easier than to state the solution in abstract terms: we must choose the right means for the right ends, and then apply our full force to achieve our goals. But what can this mean in practice? I would attach myself to a view voiced for about two and a half millenia: morality is not the highest value, and neither is power or knowledge. What matters is the best and most relevant relationship between these three—a union which in its contemplative aspect may be called wisdom and in its active phase, justice. Nothing is more difficult, nor more necessary, in practice.[5]

Let us see just how difficult it can be. On July 14, 1958, the State Department in Washington received a telegram from the President of Lebanon requesting the landing of American forces within twenty-four hours in order to save that country's political integrity and independence. The issues seemed clear enough. The President of Lebanon had been the only Middle Eastern leader to endorse the Eisenhower Doctrine, which committed the U.S. to come to the aid of any Middle Eastern country which requested assistance "against armed aggression from any country controlled by international Communism." Here, explained President Eisenhower, was a government that had been democratically elected, and that was now threatened by subversion armed and encouraged from outside. Here, as the State Department briefed the press, appeared to be a clear-cut case: we must demonstrate that we are ready to support our allies when they need us. American inaction, especially at a moment when pro-Western leaders had just been overthrown in Iraq, could result in the dominance of the Middle East by Soviet or Nasser imperialism "assuming," as American officials pondered, "that these are or could remain separate." In a recent prize-winning series on Communism, *Life* recalled our Lebanese intervention as a major demonstration that we could stop Communism in its tracks.

The real story, however, does not begin in July 1958. Early in 1957, Lebanese President Chamoun faced the bitter truth that during the preceding decade, the birthrate had shifted the balance of power in his country. In 1943, when Christian Arabs were still the majority in the country, the Moslem Arabs and the other minorities had agreed that Christians would always assume the position of President, Foreign Minister, and Commander-in-Chief of the Army while Moslems would always assume the office of the Prime Minister and the Speaker of Parliament. All other positions in the state were similarly frozen on the

basis of sectarian strength. By 1957 it had become clear to everyone that Moslems were turning into a majority, and that most Moslems and an appreciable number of Christians were being attracted to Nasser's neutralist, socialist, and authoritarian Arab nationalism.

Chamoun was unwilling, in a state founded upon ten Christian sects, three Moslem sects, and several "others," and hence viable, if at all, only by compromise, to strive for a new bargain consonant with the changing situation. He might have eased the transition to a system in which Moslems would have gained more responsibility or to a secular state in which all jobs are indiscriminately open to all men of talent, and in which Lebanese Christians, thanks to their superior education and prosperity, would have remained at least equal in influence for a long time to come. Instead, in order to make up in foreign backing for what he had lost in domestic support, he agreed to the Eisenhower Doctrine. Then, in order to perpetuate the status quo, Chamoun rigged the 1957 election enough to give himself that two-thirds parliamentary majority required to amend the constitution so that Parliament could re-elect him for a second six-year term.[6]

When the majority had thus been deprived of the effective use of the ballot while the country, hitherto neutral in intra-Arab conflicts, was being transformed into a pro-Western bulwark against the spread of neutralist Arab nationalism, the opposition resorted to bullets and the civil war began. Into this civil war, Nasser soon sent arms, money, and men, and we, after several months, our own armed forces.

One other fact has to be mentioned. Most politically active Lebanese believe that there is conclusive evidence that the Lebanese President and Foreign Minister, though they failed to consult other members of their government, had from the start acted in concert with CIA. The American intervention in Lebanon seemed to them, as to most other observers, to be part of American efforts after the Suez Crisis of late 1956 to stem the growing influence of Nasser's neutralist nationalism. This naturally raises a major question to which we shall have to return: does our knowledge of Middle Eastern forces and trends suggest that it is a moral or necessary use of American power to intervene against neutralist nationalism?

By July 14, 1958, however, there were some additional issues at stake. By the day the telegram arrived, UN observers had already succeeded in materially reducing the level of UAR intervention in Lebanon; the Commander-in-Chief of the Lebanese army, who had used his Christian-officered, but Moslem- and Christian-manned army to umpire the civil war rather than to fight the opposition, was already laying the groundwork for the compromise that would end the war

and make him President. It had also become evident that we had become progressively less eager to have Chamoun cash the blank check we had given him—calling for the intervention of American troops. On the other hand, the telegram was sent a few hours after a coup in Iraq overthrew the only Arab government bound to the West by a defense pact. Since no one in Beirut or Washington had anticipated this coup at this moment, nor knew much about its main actors, ignorance conjured up fears and fears led some to think about being close enough, if necessary, to intervene in Iraq.

In addition to seeming new dangers, those who had to answer the telegram now also had to face fundamental and conflicting moral issues only distantly related to their original intentions. Could they, seeing the Lebanese situation itself now closer to solution, afford to say no, and so let it be said by our allies in NATO and elsewhere that when it comes to a showdown, the U.S. is likely to have second thoughts? How reliable would that make us as an ally? Who would trust our pledge in the future? Yet should the United States now add a larger, more dramatic commitment to support a status quo that had already been undermined by the kind of forces against which Marines lack adequate weapons—birthrates and nationalism? What would have been a wise and just decision?

We chose to land troops. The troops fired on no one; the American mediator who entered in their wake strengthened and secured the compromise that had already been in the making. But our landing of 10,000 troops in a country half the size of New Jersey also had various other consequences. The compromise brought about the departure from his country of the all too pro-Western Foreign Minister, Charles Malik, gave the rebels the Premiership, but under the firm neutral leadership of the new President, General Chehab. The compromise has also led to a new, yet deeply frustrating deadlock among Lebanese factions. As a result, little has been done since 1958 to resolve the imbalance between political structure and political reality which helped to produce the civil war.

The case must be summed up in paradoxes. We concluded that our international status demanded our intervention at a time when we were beginning to feel that the situation in Lebanon itself no longer required it. We demonstrated to the world the solidity of our commitment to our friends, by intervening with immediate, well-coordinated, and major force, but we also exposed to the world our incapacity to airlift more than 10,000 troops to more than one trouble-spot at one time.[7] The compromise solution we helped to fashion left our closest friends without further power, so that other Middle Eastern governments could draw

various valid lessons: the United States, whether in a right or wrong cause, will not deny itself the use of force and therefore must always be reckoned with; it will employ its horses and its men in its own national interests, and not necessarily in trying to put even an apparently pro-Western Humpty Dumpty together again. Even so, the Humpty Dumpties on our side may still take comfort: we do not use our strength to make structural changes; we merely put others on top of the wall. A UN resolution propounded with remarkable unanimity by all Arab states (presumably the kind of unity which we had earlier viewed with reserve) provided the basis on which our forces agreed to leave Lebanon. And contemporary Lebanese governments find it more difficult to act on advice for dealing with their still searing problems of social change than the pre-1958 government with whom we so eagerly agreed to repress the problems of change.

I have dealt with the Lebanese intervention in such detail because no wise and just action is ever hypothetical. Unlike our interventions in Cuba or Laos, the Lebanese case also is neither familiar nor (oddly enough) controversial, and hence may most easily lead to fresh insights. For from this one example (with suitable footnotes to other similar actions), we shall be able to raise most of the relevant questions and, possibly, conclusions for the general problem we are considering.

Needless to say, I consider most aspects of our intervention in Lebanon as an unhappy demonstration of American power, morality, and knowledge. Our difficulties stem from failures in each of these three realms of power, morality and knowledge, and from the faulty connections we fashioned among them.

The Relevance of Knowledge to Moral Intervention

To begin with knowledge, we have scarcely begun to develop theories of social change that would allow us to understand the fundamental revolutions now in progress in the world, and hence to develop doctrines of intervention relevant to the politics of modernization.[8] Khrushchev has a theory. It is a dogmatic one, and it has led him into error as often as not. But he has a theory which sensitizes him to the great fact of rapid historical transformation that constitutes the modern age. It makes him more aware than we are to the probability that governments owing their power to deadlocked sectarian parochialism or to absentee landlords are not long for this world. Communists are not responsible for having started the revolution of modernization and Khrushchev is dogmatically wrong about the inevitability of the next stage of social development. But if we compete against his partially correct theory about social change with no theory at all, he may well turn out to be right about the next stage as well, not because of his

theory but because of our errors and omissions.

Lacking a theory that would help us understand the transformation of societies, we have tended to play for possible lucky breaks in history, though the breaks have not always come or do not always linger. Or else we have tended to be hard-headedly manipulative, but without a sense of theory or ideology. We are the inventors of a new kind of revolution—the hit-and-run revolution. We help make it and go home and leave the politics of social change, that alone can justify and fulfill a revolution, almost entirely to others who have even less appreciation of the problems of social transformation than we do.

We are not entirely without knowledge. If we do not yet possess a major theory about social change as broad in its concerns and as related to action as Marx's, but a hundred years younger and less dogmatic (for it would lead to mischief merely to look for a counter-creed), we still have available a number of insights that would form part of any such theory. One such proposition, for example, is that improved administrative efficiency, economic amelioration, and political concessions offered by a regime that is morally and politically isolated from the most important newly emergent classes cannot preserve political consensus has broken down, the price of political stability in modern times is to overcome the moral and political isolation between ruler and ruled. This certainly requires, among other things, economic and administrative progress but these cannot substitute for political enterprise that goes to the root of the matter. Another proposition is that the longer repression succeeds in postponing the political adjustments to the transformation of a society's structure and values, the more likely it is that the more extreme and violent elements will gain leadership of the opposition. From these propositions alone it would follow that you can, if you must, use Marines to intervene, in a rebellion affecting a change in top personnel. You can not, even if you try, use Marines effectively to intervene in a revolution that is transforming what men believe, how they live, and how they relate to each other.

The revolution of the peoples of the underdeveloped areas to build institutions that would put them in command rather than at the mercy of the forces of modernization is more searing than any that ever confronted the West. It takes place, for the most part, in the face of fewer resources and skills, greater poverty and population pressure, and in societies that were, until a few decades ago, sure of their ancient truths and traditions. They are now driven by the pressure of sheer needs and new aspirations and the pain of backwardness and powerlessness in the presence of the industrialized nations to pass through their revolution in telescoped time.

If we have failed to understand the dimensions of the forces now transforming Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and viewed them frequently from the shallower perspective of cliques and personalities struggling for power, the fault has not only been in the inadequate state of our intellectual knowledge. The experience that would make us receptive to such knowledge has until recently been lacking. Our own society has been in the midst of constant change, but we have always, barring one civil war, been able to maintain a consensus on our basic social, economic, moral and political values and institutions. We have been able to pay so much attention to the individual because we could afford to take our institutions for granted. We are only beginning to experience the pain of bafflement and frustration that comes from living in a world changing both hopefully and dangerously, and certainly quickly and seemingly beyond control. We are coming to recognize that our institutions are not yet adequate to maintain peace, eliminate ignorance, bigotry and poverty, deal with the sheer growth of the number of people, facts and institutions, master technology, and preserve and spread beauty. We are only gradually becoming interested in the theory and practice of social change.

We cannot yet effectively capitalize on our knowledge in this field because we have so far invested much more in power than in the knowledge on which the prudent and effective exercise of power must be based. We intervene about as often in the internal affairs of other nations as the USSR, but the world is (and we ourselves ought to be) harder on us when we do. Since intervention, when it involves duress, is normally neither a legal nor a democratic exercise, we must have better reasons, founded on better values and sounder knowledge when we intervene than are offered by Communist dogma.

One reason for our intervention is, of course, partly beyond our control: we cannot be secure in a non-Communist world where domestic political life is in turmoil or guided by dogmatic or cynical adventurers. Within limits, the USSR can prosper from such instability. But not all burdens which this invidious problem imposes on us are inescapable. Had we really explored the roots and implications of neutralism when we intervened against it in Lebanon and Laos? Have we explored all mechanisms by which internal conflicts can be insulated from the cold war?

Our lack of knowledge and foresight about problems of Asian, African and Latin American stability in which we have an intrinsically greater stake than the USSR also often forces us into intervention against our expectations. We often fail to anticipate crises. Yet there is a world of difference between the range of choices and the decisions one

can make when one is aware of the forces and trends of history and the decision at a moment of crisis—when you are no longer free to pick the issue but when you must say yea or nay. On July 14, 1958, we were no longer free to say nay in Lebanon and break our word, yet many were the options we had before that day.

The position of the United States in world affairs, for the sake of power and morality alike, puts a premium on adequate knowledge. Yet the institutional barriers remain high against overcoming our historical ignorance and preconceptions about our rapidly changing world. Until very recently, we were governed by a generation whose education did not include knowledge about that majority of the world which lives in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. A large number of our policy-makers are lawyers, and many lawyers tend to see history as moving from case to case, instead of as a ceaseless trial that can sometimes be made to move in one direction rather than another but that has no final solutions. We are also, as a people, so action-minded that many of our best and most devoted policy-makers are seldom tempted enough, and therefore seldom find time enough, after their intense preoccupation with the evils that are sufficient unto the day, to think about the relevance of their actions to the long-term forces and trends of history. The machinery they have built over the years reflects their predilections. It swarms with facts; it seethes (if not always productively) with action, but few parts of State or CIA are smaller than those whose task it is to devote themselves, full-time, to long-range analysis and estimates.

Knowledge, however, bears an effective relationship not only to power but also to morality. One major reason why there is not yet a controlling international sense of morality is that the world does not yet share a single structure of knowledge, values, and sanctions. This moral deficiency in turn demands and perpetuates a hierarchical inequality of knowledge in each nation. This is an issue of intrinsic yet unavoidable danger. Precisely on the most vital questions of power, where emotions most require the discipline of knowledge and life itself may be at stake, knowledge can least of all be prudently shared with others who will certainly experience the consequences of action. Just prior to intervention and war, security is likely to dictate the greatest restrictions, even within the government itself, on men's "need to know."

Granting all this, I believe nonetheless that we have let secrecy hinder the application of knowledge and advice so far that both morality and power have suffered. This is worth saying especially since all the pressures are still moving in the direction of narrowing the spread of knowledge and the range of debate: witness President Kennedy's pleas for voluntary press censorship after the Cuban intervention. As long as

rivalries among independent sovereignties force citizens to accept an inequality of knowledge about questions of security, it remains all the more essential to insist that the leaders of our nation persist in constant exchange with the moral and political consensus of their community. Yet their isolation from that consensus is proceeding apace. We are, as a nation, approaching the moral disability of the international system as a whole. Differences in power positions are leading to growing differences in knowledge, values, and sanctions available to different segments of our community.

The fact that the community can no longer arrive at a sense of wisdom and justice because it lacks adequate knowledge and power in the crucial fields of subversion, weapons technology, and social change in strange civilizations makes its notions about the morality of intervention often impractical or else seemingly relevant only because its maxims survived from an earlier age when our institutions were being created and knowledge, power and morality were still more closely entwined with each other. Compensations for this weakness are possible but they are seldom brought into play. Our leaders do not, on the basis of their own special knowledge, take much more time to lead the discussion that could clarify our national purpose than they now take for clarifying the historical and moral context of their acts of intervention. On the contrary, they sometimes feel impelled right up to the moment of intervention to speak enthusiastically against it.[9] Congress seems to have yielded its legislative and educational power on fundamental national issues to the Supreme Court, but the Supreme Court will not be able to guide us with equal strength on foreign affairs. Congress has a watchdog committee over the Atomic Energy Commission which can transform matter but still neglects to appoint a similar committee over CIA which can transform men and history.

Most of the press west of the Potomac is of little help in discussing and clarifying issues that could lead to intervention. Bipartisanship among our political leaders helped turn the failure of our intervention in Cuba into a numbing celebration of national unity before the discussion had scarcely begun, and inhibits debate on Laos or Vietnam. In contrast to democratic Britain, we also suffer from a peculiar form of patriotism. While the British Parliament sharply debated the merits of the Suez invasion of 1956 while it was in progress, and similarly argued British troops landings in Jordan contemporary with American landings in Lebanon in 1958, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Mr. Rayburn, effectively stopped debate in Congress during the Lebanese intervention by saying that "in times like these we had better allow matters to develop rather than make remarks about them." Though our

national interest had become deeply involved, our survival as a nation was not at stake in Lebanon. Why then should the noble sentiment of patriotism turn into a crippling disease of eye, ear, nose and throat? Is a Congressional, instead of a parliamentary, system doomed either to irrelevance or irresponsibility in the conduct of today's foreign affairs?

The top decision-makers are thus usually left to pursue the national interest, especially in the field of interventions, without any lively, free, or constant touch with the moral and intellectual consensus of the nation or its most representative institutions. What is more, this relative isolation of the decision-makers from the community's consensus, rendered painless by the community's widespread stereotyped acquiescence, persists in institutionalized form almost to the pinnacles of power. Few are the experts in government who are consulted prior to an intervention. What is publicly known about our intervention in Cuba in 1961 illustrates this. Considerations of security, curbing the security-cleared government official's access to information, may well at times have harmed our security.

It is my impression that there are very few among our experts at intervention who are not hard-working, intelligent, imaginative, and courageous far above the average of men. It is also my impression, however, (and this one more likely to be erroneous than the first) that just as the Office of War Information during World War II tended to attract an unusually large number of men who responded to the grandly heroic, hopefully liberal, and victory-promising aspects of the war, so CIA has attracted a core of men similarly attuned to one aspect of their task and their age. They know they are engaged in a cold war without foreseeable end, in an institution which reflects America's recent reaction against its long infatuation with idealistic legalism and its tough-minded discovery of the morality of power. They are involved in a task that must avoid publicity as much as possible, engaged in acts they would not countenance as citizens in their own country, blocked from discussing their problems with anyone but their immediate colleagues, under attack more often from the liberal moralist than the rightist actionist. They have rejected the ideological historicism of their enemy, but they have not yet developed a systematic understanding of their own concerning the forces of history. It is not surprising, therefore, that CIA should have attracted to its ranks of expert interventionists especially the technician of power and the energetic but doctrineless conservative. They are not the only kind of person working at CIA, but their presence inhibits that concern with the linking of knowledge, morality, and power that insures, as far as it can be insured by man, wise and just intervention.[10]

We have been fortunate so far that at the very top of power, in the Presidency, and often close to it, the country has been blessed ever since our final initiation as a world power—during the months preceding our entrance into World War II—with leadership of intelligence and morality. If the actions and interventions of this leadership have not always lived up to expectations, it is in part because our leaders are human and not omnipotent. It is in part also because they have been most intimately in touch with two, not entirely helpful, collections of men. On issues of intervention, the broad American constituency acquiesces in any seeming success against Communism and is most erratic in the interpretation and punishment of what it, or some segment of the public, considers failures. (Compare the public's reaction to China, Cuba, Lebanon, and Congo.) The other group, the President's most immediate advisers on intervention, have labored under the limitations which we have been describing, affecting the state of the art and constituting a profession more skilled in surgery than in the problems of disease. The final responsibilities of the President cannot be lessened, but under present circumstances, the handicaps under which any President must decide on intervention are dangerously high. A wiser American consensus on the merit and uses of intervention has become a necessity for clarifying and sustaining that final decision which only one man can make in each concrete case. Informed public discussion of at least the fundamental issues and types of intervention is essential to this end. But discussion is no longer a simple task. It could easily make intervention of any kind more difficult to carry out. It could arouse public pressure for crusades in behalf of moralism. Practice and passion have outrun discussion. Whatever the perils, there is no way of creating a relevant consensus except by discussion.

Types and Uses of Intervention

As one contribution to such a discussion, I should like to examine several types of intervention and ask to what degree each might be wise or just.

Counter-intervention: No other kind of intervention is as easy to justify. It is an action designed to help free a country from the interventionist manipulations of another power and so enable it to regain its sovereign integrity and independence—that is, to stand free again of all interventions. It is coercion intended to create options rather than, as in the Soviet intervention in Hungary, to foreclose them.

Easy to justify, it is not at all easy to do well. For while it is not

unreasonably difficult to define the point at which intervention becomes imperative, it is most difficult to help create that degree of internal stability which makes it prudent again to end intervention. Intervention involves, clearly, not merely a manipulation of power but a sharing in the historical trials of others.

Intervention Through Indirect Imperialist Rule: Though its advocates may wish to call it "preventive intervention" it closely resembles the form of colonialism known as "indirect rule." We intervene to impose rulers who promise to be resolutely anti-Communist, but we leave them otherwise free to pursue any domestic policy they please. This indirect imperialist form of intervention has caused the United States more harm than any other kind of initiative we have undertaken, in particular because—for a number of good reasons—it can usually be counted upon to produce the very dangers we most feared when we first embarked on such adventures.

The initial argument raised in favor of indirect imperialist intervention is normally not confined to the reasonable proposition that if the USSR or its agents are about to intervene, why let the USSR gain the initiative—why wait until the legal government can no longer seek our aid and we are forced to embark on the more difficult path of helping to organize a counter-revolution? Such clear and present danger would justify *Pre-emptive Intervention.* (And the final justification of such a pre-emptive purchase of time is, of course, what constructive use we make of it.) The argument for indirect imperialist intervention goes further. It does not trust the existing government, one composed, say, of Laotian neutralists, to invite our aid *if* pressed by the USSR or its agents. It does not trust Mosadeq of Iran or Kassim of Iraq to know when or how to stop short of opportunistic collaboration with local Communists. Or, in the form of an Anglo-French argument, it does not trust Nasser to keep the Suez Canal open or run it efficiently. One could readily list more examples: it has been our favorite form of forceful intervention, and it has almost inevitably backfired. Why?

It was founded, in part, on insufficient knowledge. In an Asia, Africa, and Latin America that have a highly sensitive pride in their new nationalism, the danger that neutralist nationalists might willingly yield to Soviet control has usually been less than we have feared. On the other hand, the danger that "pro-Western" regimes, by stifling popular nationalist and reformist impulses, would sap their internal support has been far greater than we usually anticipated. We have also tended to underestimate the readiness and effectiveness, as in the Congo, or in Syria between 1954 and 1958, with which nationalists will turn to whichever great power did not intervene first for countervailing

force against the original transgressor. The results might have been much worse, had it not been possible to mobilize UN intervention to counter national interventions which the U.S. did not support, as at Suez, or about which it had second thoughts, as in the Congo.

Indirect imperialist intervention has been pernicious morally because it has invariably been invoked against nationalist neutralists instead of Communists, apparently on the devil-ridden notion, happily on the decline since about 1960, that those who are not with us are against us. It has thus obscured the moral distinction between our sense of world order and that of the Communists, all the more so since the USSR has, from about 1951, based its foreign policy on the premise that those who were not against it were potentially for it.

In the realm of power, indirect imperialist intervention has therefore alienated rather than won people. It has never been truly preventive. In no instance—neither in Iran nor Lebanon nor Laos or in other places not to be mentioned—has power been devoted to the creation of that dynamic stability that might produce a resilience and immunization to subversion by extremist forces. In the future, indirect imperialist intervention may prove even less pertinent as an exercise in power than before. Given the state of the international Communist movement, not every local Communist coup may be automatically interpreted as a Moscow initiative. It may be a new thorn in Moscow's (or Peking's) side. Yugoslavia may not be the only Communist nation we can afford to live with.

Precautionary Intervention: This involves a kind of action which our government and our people have least discussed. Let me, for the moment therefore, merely outline some of the pros and cons of such intervention.

Among the most significant examples of how we failed to intervene in time are Hitler's Germany three decades ago and Algeria, where French colonial policy had reached a dead end more than a decade ago. Today the most foreboding case is probably the Republic of South Africa. Our own moderate southerner need not fear: there is an obvious distinction between a policy intent upon achieving rapid equality, with deliberate speed, and a policy bent on perpetuating and deepening racial inequality. There is a technical strategic question (there usually is)—can we defend ourselves successfully against missiles looped around the South Pole without the cooperation of the Republic of South Africa? But there is also one obvious estimate to be made: within the next few years, the Republic of South Africa is going to be a bloodier battleground within the free world than Algeria, because the Republic has no imperial overlord that can act as final arbiter, because the white

settlers do not have an obvious place to which to return (though there are available areas for emigration), and the grievances of the non-Europeans are obviously worse than in Algeria. Do we intervene now or after the bloodbath starts? Do we insist on a solution now, or after the Communists gain greater influence among the Africans, and other African nations also covertly intervene?

The objections to such intervention can be phrased in terms applicable to both the Republic of South Africa and to other similar areas. Is the United State to intervene in the domestic affairs of countries with which we have satisfactory foreign relations? Are we to intervene wherever men are oppressed and exploited? Do we not establish a mischievous breach in international law if we proclaim our right to overthrow tyrants who, however brutal at home, trespass on none of their neighbors? After all, we do not intervene against Communism because it is tyrannous but because it is expansionist and threatening us. If precautionary intervention from outside seems prudent, should it not be reserved for the collective action of the states of the region or, when that appears infeasible, the United Nations?

The contrary position is not destroyed by these arguments, however. The various regions of the world suffer from various limitations in handling precautionary intervention by agreement among their constituent states. Neither Asia as such, nor any important subregion with it, possess the requisite unity for this kind of joint positive action. Africa might be able to act in unison, but only against European, not African, leadership on that continent. The Americas cannot act without us, and might not act with us. UN action, affected by these differences among and within regions, therefore depends powerfully on the response of the United States. What do we stand for in the world? We no longer, to be sure, intervene to collect our debts. Some of our best friends are now our debtors. But shall we only intervene against tryranny which expands abroad, and take obviously milder measures against other evils, so that we seem to become champions of the status quo while the USSR makes itself the champion of racial equality and the abolition of poverty and exploitation?

I am not yet sure how to resolve all these questions, in principle. When it comes to practice, however, I am certain that the gassing of millions of human beings, or the official suppression of elemental human rights to millions of others because of the color of their skin must not be placed beyond remedy as a "domestic issue." I must confess that I liked very much the last paragraph of President Kennedy's letter answering Chairman Khrushchev's protest against our Cuban intervention: "I believe, Mr. Chairman, that you should recognize that free people in all

parts of the world do not accept the claim of historical inevitability for Communist revolution. What your government believes is its business; what it does in the world is the world's business. The great revolution in the history of man, past, present and future, is the revolution of those determined to be free."[11] But the letter ends at that point, and the operating clause that would show how this statement could be made effective is missing, just as it was from the Cuban intervention in the Bay of Pigs.

I think it may be possible, however, to distinguish among (1) countries which, despite tyranny (or its obverse, instability), are yet some distance from internal warfare involving extremists, or foreign adventurism inviting aggression; (2) countries which, like Ataturk's Turkey, have chosen an authoritarian road that is intended to lead to democracy; and (3) countries like the Union of South Africa, Iran or Jordan, which are clearly heading for the kind of catastrophic internal or external explosion which will make intervention by outside powers unavoidable. In the first two categories, the United States might well undertake the kind of joint precautionary and constructive diplomatic and economic measures that constitute *Intervention in Partnership,* even though the disparity of power and needs between the collaborating parties seldom permits this kind of partnership to proceed without friction. In this sense, the "Alliance for Progress" with Latin America is an agreement giving the United States and other participating states the right to create effective pressures for altering the social, economic, and political structure of Latin American states for the sake of ultimately putting an end to tyranny, instability, and poverty. In the third category of countries, is not the real choice between precautionary intervention and subsequent intervention under much more unfavorable terms? Our little-publicized but morally and politically sound intervention against the Trujillo dictatorship soon after our Cuban fiasco demonstrates our ability to act prudently and effectively in the realm of precautionary intervention.

There are other forms of intervention. One is equivalent to bear-baiting without invitation in other people's gardens, as when, for a time, we subsidized Chinese Nationalist troops on Burmese soil—but it would not be rewarding to explore further in that direction. Another is constructive, though it seldom earns credit in the short run, as when we inject ourselves powerfully as arbiters in disputes that touch us only because they divide two countries friendly with us. Espionage is also a form of intervention when it involves entering without permission into areas, on the ground or in the air, that fall under the national jurisdiction of other states. This kind of intervention, having the com-

mendable purpose of expanding the world's knowledge, is based upon rules of the game implicitly agreed upon among the nations. As an activity, it damages the international system less than adultery damages the institution of marriage. Like adultery, it damages the formal system of intercourse whenever the culprit is caught or insists on publicly championing his right to adultery. That was our compounded sin in the U-2 incident. Unlike adultery, which can damage most by the act itself, that is, by betraying love and trust, no love or trust are present to be undermined in the international system, a vital point to which we shall return in our conclusion.

Toward the Limitation of Intervention

Surely it is a symptom of the aberrant state of the world that the preceding section might well have been entitled, "Toward a Wise and Just American Intervention in the Internal Affairs of Other Nations." I submit that such a discussion is necessary, but I cannot bring myself to suppose that it would be wise or just to stop here. No state has the sovereign right to intervene in the internal affairs of another sovereign state. It is not merely a contradiction in terms but an attack on the very system on which the freedom of every nation rests. It cannot be dismissed as a "mere" breach of international law. It undermines the very structure of a world order which is most imperfect, but in whose survival we have a far greater stake than does the USSR, for unlike the intended Communist international system, the present international order contains the actuality of national freedom and the potentiality of voluntary collaboration.

We have two choices especially worth discussing. We can accept the world as a jungle in which right and wrong do not apply but only survival matters, and we concentrate on improving the skill and thrust of our power. Since we are still in a jungle, it would be foolish not to do so. Since we do not want to remain where we are, since our very lingering is likely to spell our doom, we must also act to limit the terms of the competition and enlarge the effective power of law.

At the moment we are doing badly. We accept as inescapable the proposition that the challenge posed by the USSR gives us the right and duty to intervene, and that we can deny the same right of intervention to the USSR by threatening to escalate the kind of forces we shall enlist in the fray.[12] To ease the burden and danger of our vigilante activities in a lawless world, we have tried several methods. We have tried to explain to the world the superior justice of our cause. Most people

might well grant that ours is a better country to live in than the USSR, but the appreciation of the justice of our cause has often been marred by the kind of interventions by which we have tried to translate justice into practice and by our talk, perhaps justifiable on other grounds but certainly far more frightening than any uttered by the USSR, about the risks we would take in behalf of justice. And though some are tempted, there is an attitude toward the justice of our cause which we cannot afford to adopt. "Intimidation," Trotsky wrote, "is a powerful weapon of policy, both internationally and internally. . . . The revolution works the same way: it kills individuals, and intimidates thousands. . . . 'But in that case, in what do your tactics differ from the tactics of Tsarism?' we are asked by the high priests of Liberalism. . . . You do not understand this, holy men? We shall explain it to you. The terror of Tsarism was directed against the proletariat. . . . Our Extraordinary Commissions shoot landlords, capitalists, and generals who are striving to restore the capitalist order. Do you grasp this—distinction? Yes? For us Communists it is quite sufficient. . . ."[13] Should means no longer matter to us, justice will become a remote question.

We have also tried to ease our burden by emphasizing order above social change, taking care to improve the repressive machinery of other governments, and through economic aid, to diminish the political violence which often topples rulers in rapid succession in Asia, Africa and Latin America. We have often neglected, however, to develop the political enterprise by which they and we might limit the international consequences of such internal warfare. By giving priority to order, we found it more difficult to seize such political initiative, for while it is true that control of rapid social change itself requires strong, stable authority, such resilient stability is unlikely to arise in most underdeveloped areas until many more fundamental changes have taken place.

In a similar vein, we have championed world law without adequate study of how law might play a constructive role in a rapidly and fundamentally changing world. Our concept of law is fit largely for a world in which political conflicts no longer touch the very purpose and character of life. We have, moreover, failed to live up to international law which we have helped to shape.[14] For example, we agreed in Article 15 of the Charter of Bogata (1948) that "no state or group of states has the right to intervene directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed attack but also any other form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the state or against the political, economic and cultural elements." In Article 16,

we agreed that "no state may use or encourage the use of coercive measures of an economic or political character in order to force the sovereign will of another state or obtain from it advantages of any kind."

It is true that in subsequent treaties we and the Latin Americans agreed on collective intervention against the encroachments of Communism in this hemisphere, that we and they could not agree on effective action against Guatemala and Cuba, and that we therefore had no alternative, as our government saw it, but to proceed unilaterally against a danger condemned in principle by collective agreement. I would not worry so much about such a few, somewhat ambiguous breaches of law—hope, patience, and fortitude have sustained the international system as much as law, and these are not as gravely damaged yet by such actions as is the law—except that I foresee no end to such breaches, and it is this which makes me fearful. We have already reached a dangerous point. After our Lebanese intervention, our Secretary of State, forgetful of the origins of our travail, thought of asking for a UN resolution against "indirect aggression," but relented when he remembered how vulnerable we would be both in the debate and through the intended law.

One may sympathize with those who would judge our record in this field with some forebearance, pointing out that our nation has only recently arrived fully as a world power. (Our interventions prior to World War II had an impact only on our immediate region and only an indirect effect on the world order.) But one must not sympathize too long, for we shall not be given much time to learn our lessons. It is imperative to move on, if not yet to world government, at least into a system based on self-restraint, constructive forms of intervention, and a broader overlap of national interests.

I do not think such a movement is impossible. Self-restraint would mean, for example, rejecting Edmond Taylor's recent proposal in *The Reporter* for "encouraging and explicitly accepting responsibility for the revolutionary forces behind the Iron Curtain. . . . We should oppose only premature and uncoordinated insurrections."[15] It would mean curing ourselves of the anxious and dogmatic aggressiveness that has caused us to intervene against neutralists and authoritarian socialists in usually unjustified fear of the next stage in their development. It would require us not to treat every Communist challenge—as in 1961 in Cuba—as an issue of survival, and not to turn any confrontation that could affect survival into alternatives that must lead either to complete victory or complete defeat.

Such a strategy would also involve forebearance when non-Communists challenge the status quo. Imposing the high standards of

American political comfort on the rest of the world, we have scarcely paused to be surprised by how the passing of traditional society has been accompanied by far less violence in most of Asia, Africa and Latin America than during a similar period in Western Europe. But we must not expect this historical transformation to be an entirely peaceful event, nor prepare to intervene whenever it is not.

We shall have to be more tolerant of violence connected with the end of the system of colonial domination than with violence threatening the system which governs the relationship among independent states. (India's usually justifiably high ideals have often fallen short of India's sometimes justifiable and sometimes unjustifiable practices. Our reaction to Goa, however, was an idealistic exaggeration unmindful of the distinction I have suggested.) I believe we should insist that the arbitrary and artificial frontiers drawn by Europeans for African and Middle Eastern states must not be altered by direct aggression, but forebearance of a kind unjustified in Europe may also be in order when such kindred peoples intervene, short of aggression, in each others' affairs. We need neither to become involved in their rivalries nor protect them from such excesses in their attempts to achieve unity. Counter-intervention would be justified, however, to keep other great powers from exploiting such rearrangements.

Above all, we need to rid ourselves of the erroneous notion that whenever a privileged Western position in Asia, Africa, or Latin America is lost, the USSR correspondingly gains. The conversion of a pro-Western nation like Iraq to neutralism is not a loss to the West. On the contrary, it usually rids the West of a discreditable relationship and in bringing about a neutralist state, creates a situation with which we, by virtue of our sense of world order, can live but which the USSR is pledged to alter. Whether our subsequent relationship with a former client state is satisfactory or not depends on our mutual ability to transform our relationship by cementing overlapping national interests and enhancing such a country's internal stability.

That brings us to the second major task in moving toward a more lawful world, namely finding more constructive forms of intervention. Self-restraint may be helpful in reducing instability and tension within the international system as a whole, but it cannot prevent or cure the internal conflicts within countries of the non-Communist world that incite the interventions of the great powers. We also need to develop wiser and more just forms of precautionary and counter-intervention.

A number of possibilities may be suggested. Diplomacy, and at worst, the threat of unilateral intervention, may be employed for the specific purpose of persuading the reluctant smaller nations of a region

to act or even intervene collectively themselves in order to avoid the intervention of a great power. This, after much waste motion, was the final outcome in Lebanon when all the usually disunited Arab states agreed not to intervene, and even more effectively and with greater dispatch in Kuwait where the Arab states agreed collectively to protect that country against Iraq intervention. Increasingly it may be possible to parlay the threat of great power intervention, as in the Congo, or earlier in Lebanon, into UN intervention.[16] Since great power intervention is initially masked in most instances, and there is no international law-enforcement agency that can investigate and act in time, the counter-intervention may have to be initiated by the United States. But such action should from the first moment be accompanied by a pledge to withdraw as soon as a UN or regional peace force can take its place while those employing force under the duress or discipline of a great foreign power withdraw their threat.[17] An international police force should therefore be organized so as to be in constant readiness.

Precautionary intervention could also be internationalized to a considerable degree. Societies that are already deeply split politically and therefore are unwilling to become dependent on a single great power should be helped in larger (and not merely technical) measure through the UN.[18] Aid from the USSR should also be welcomed, even for joint projects, for what counts is not the source of the money and not even the prestige it earns for a foreign power, but the constructive use to which it is put inside the country.

Neither our self-restraint nor more constructive forms of intervention will help, however, unless the USSR reciprocates in like fashion. Is there any hope that the two powers might develop and enlarge an overlap of national interests in the realm of intervention? It is just such reciprocity that finally creates international law. Fortunately, such an overlap already exists to a significant degree, though amid the sound and fury we have paid little attention to it.

We are now operating on implicit rules that keep the USSR from intervening in sufficient measure within the Western community and the Western hemisphere to make it the decisive force in placing its local men in power and protecting them there. We have accepted the same restrictions within the Soviet satellite area. This does not mean that the Soviets or the West refrain from intervening in each other's realm in a great many other ways. But Hungary and Cuba indicate the limits of the game with precision. In October 1962, it had clearly become necessary to take bold measures to remind the USSR of these tacit rules as they affect Cuba. Moscow agreed with no resistance and little delay. We, however, offered only to pledge ourselves not to

undertake an outright invasion.

In the uncommitted but hitherto non-Communist areas of the world, the USSR is willing to take risks, but not as many as we do in intervening. We have never been deterred from intervention in these areas by fear of the Soviet reaction. By contrast, in several instances where the USSR had excellent opportunities for assisting Communists in seizing control (as in Iran in 1953, Syria in 1955-58, and Iraq in 1958-60),[19] the USSR restrained itself for fear of the international consequences. It is also noteworthy that the USSR no less than the smaller states in the UN agreed that it would be better, even after the murder of the undoubtedly popular Lumumba, to let Congolese fight each other as Congolese rather than as great power puppets. Nor are these instances accidental. One of the chief conflicts between the USSR and China concerns the risks the USSR does not think it prudent to take in assisting "national wars of liberation."

What can we do to harden and to multiply the number of these restricting rules of the game? The first (there is no avoiding it) must be to keep ourselves strong enough to convince the USSR, and increasingly also China, that the risks of intervention on their part remain too high to allow them to take chances. Secondly, we must take diplomatic initiatives to reduce the incitements to intervention. It might be useful to explore, for example, whether it might help to agree to neutralize the Middle East—outlawing all foreign military alliances and foreign bases, agreeing on limitations of arms shipments to the area, and on collective steps from outside to prevent any border from being changed by military aggression.[20] Such steps might lessen tensions within the region, allow a major shift of local resources from military preparedness to projects that could enhance economic, social, and political stability, lessen the dangers flowing from actual Communist involvement in locally endemic *coups d'etat* from reaching the dimensions of a serious crisis, and restrict the possible need for counter-interventions to those more generally acceptable to the international community—namely to keep neutrals from being subverted from their neutrality.

It would indeed serve to improve international order for us to help all non-Communist states, whether neutralist or not, to cope with the unbalancing forces of uncontrolled social change and so help them lay foundations on which to build independent and responsible foreign and domestic policies. However much we might prefer a policy of close alignment, it might be acknowledged that the great majority of neutralists in Asia and Africa have demonstrated both the will and the skill to make sure that both the West and the Communist bloc remain on hand competing for advantage among them, each ensuring that the

other shall not gain predominance in the area. The interplay of these countervailing forces, and the extraordinary nationalist sensitivity of these new states to any new form of colonialism constitute powerful new forces at work since the 1950's in restricting the intervention of the great powers. The weaker nations of the world are thus for the first time beginning to help define the rules of international relationships.[21]

Among diplomatic initiatives, it might also be worth exploring whether our explicit acknowledgement of the status quo in Eastern Europe might have two worthwhile consequences. It could help to institutionalize the rules of the game of intervention. It might also have more fundamental consequences. By diminishing our pressure on Eastern Europe, we make it harder for the foes of relaxed controls within the Communist world to justify their position, and thus we might help ultimately both to ease the pressures within the Soviet elite for adventurous interventions abroad and ease pressures for conformity among the satellites. Accepting the status quo might thus make changes in the status quo more likely—and thus become a most constructive form of intervention.

The USSR is unlikely in the foreseeable future to accept our conception of international order. Though the threat which Soviet behavior thus raises for us may tempt us to copy Soviet techniques, it behooves us to work harder by far instead to attain standards of world law and justice to which the uncommitted might be won, and which the USSR could ignore only at the cost of incurring international sanctions.

This task is no longer as easy as it might have sounded in the 1920's. Today it is painfully apparent that the demands of international law and international justice do not yet coincide, in part because the old historical order which set our present standards has become dangerously fragile, in part because our present standards are not shared by our principal adversary, nor even by all the rest of the world. To argue that in such a world our self-interest and what we hold to be our superior values justify our intervention, however coercive, as long as it succeeds, is to risk the attainment of the surer morality based on law for the sake of morality based on power. It would certainly lead to a conflict with the USSR in which no holds were barred except on grounds of inefficiency, and hence the present difference in values between us would cease. To argue, on the other hand, that until intervention achieves in the international order that lawful status which it now possesses in all domestic societies, there should be a moral and political presumption against intervention abroad, is to champion law at the expense of justice and ultimately to threaten law itself. Let us observe and insist on respect for national sovereignty, and try to resolve conflicts

in bargaining among these sovereignties. But if national sovereignty is threatened, or itself clearly threatens peace, freedom or justice, wisdom demands intervention, but in such forms as will best enhance these values and improve the opportunities for the growth of an international order in which these values could endure.

God, Man, and the Purpose of Intervention

This essay must not end, however, without speaking of two elements which have so far been ignored in this analysis of the morality of intervention. We have talked only about national states. We have said nothing about the human being as individual and nothing about God.

The Austrian writer Kraus gave the last line in one of his plays to God, who, contemplating the destruction of the world proceeding under his eyes, declared, "I did not will it." A recent writer in *worldview* has wondered whether nuclear death might not save more Christian souls for eternal life than life under atheistic Communism. I hesitate to conclude that any man could know God's earthly preferences with such precision. We have been given the capacity to distinguish life that is based on loving one's neighbor from life based on killing him or being indifferent to him. This is the core of our knowledge and of our guide to action; the rest is deduction, induction, or dogmatic assertion. We also know how fragile, uncertain, and even absurd this knowledge is, for God has obviously left himself free not only to love but to destroy.

I have therefore spoken in this essay only about our responsibility to act wisely, justly, and with love. I think it is most fortunate for the potentials of justice in international relations that this responsibility arises whether one believes in God or not. It would be fearful it it were not so, for the world which is unlikely to be converted soon to the same view of intervention is even less likely to be converted soon to the same theology. Some men also know how this fits in with God's plans, but I believe that our inescapable ignorance on this subject imposes (as does faith in God) the added responsibility of humility in international relations.

If we commonly err by confusing God's will with our concrete aims in foreign policy, we usually also err by ignoring the existence of concrete individual human beings in discussing the justice of foreign interventions by the abstract collectivity known as the nation-state. If law is not yet an alternative to force in international relations, and indeed requires force, law cannot rest on force alone. The moral individual, however, will not be content with justice; he will prefer a

world in which public authority establishes an area of security and justice in which love becomes possible. Instead, he is often confronted by the essential idiocy of politics in which, to take a recent example, his family is shelled only on odd days on an off-shore island that has no military value in preparation for interventions which neither side is in a position to pursue. He knows that interventions are concerned with issues of national power far more often than with poverty, tyranny, or exploitation. As if in compensation for this neglect of the daily concerns of most men, his national leaders make policies based in part on estimates of the personal sincerity or trust or goodwill of a Nasser or Eden as if international relations already allowed for more than the identification and enhancement of common national interests. What we share with any rational leaders, whatever their personal morality, is a common interest in the right of their nations to establish foundations which will allow them (and all other nations) to pursue responsibly independent foreign and domestic policies. In such a common interest lie the potentials both for public justice among nations and personal dignity and love among individuals within nations.

The technicians of power, having shrewdly rejected the illusion that national and individual morality are automatically the same, stop short and do not see that the unfinished task is to relate national purpose to the kind of international justice that gives security and freedom for justice and love to develop among individuals. Indeed, they tend through the prestigious position of their manipulative power to diminish the citizen's concern with love, till he feels embarrassed by the very mention of it in a context of power. In the insecure world in which we live, national loyalty and solidarity have become more precious to most peoples than justice and love. Still, the existence of a nation, any nation, is not justified except as it and its interventions preserve and enhance the individual's capacity to be wise, just, and to love. Mere security can most cheaply be purchased by surrender.

NOTES

[1] I am deeply indebted to Ernest W. Lefever, Washington Consultant to the Council on Religion and International Affairs, for first inviting me to explore these ideas under the intellectually hospitable and rewarding auspices of the Council; to Robert E. Osgood, Robert C. Good, John Courtney Murray S.J., Robert C. Tucker, Arthur Hertzberg, Robert Gordis, William A. Lybrand, Samuel P. Huntington, Kenneth W. Thompson and William Lee Miller, who served as Chairmen or first Discussants during Council consultations; and to the board of trustees and the staff of the Council, and to more than fifty government officials, men of religion and scholars who joined for several intensive hours in Washington and New York to discuss an earlier draft; and to Gregory Massell, Thomas P. Thornton, and Betsy Steele Halpern, who read this paper at various stages. The ideas offered here owe much to their criticism and suggestions even if, at times, this revision may only serve to clarify and sharpen differences of opinion. Needless to say, I speak for no one in this essay but myself.

[2] Robert Batchelder has raised the question of what responsibilities the American government ought to accept when a private U.S. corporation establishes a plant abroad which, by virtue of the scope of its activities in an otherwise underdeveloped country, not only dominates that economy but sets in motion a social and political transformation which the local government is too weak to guide into channels conducive to domestic welfare and national independence. On the more limited question of the rights of private companies abroad, the U.S. government has for several decades now adhered to the policy that each nation has the right to nationalize foreign property provided it pays fair compensation.

[3] For example, agreeing to the holding of a Summit conference because, among other reasons, it may benefit the British conservatives in a forthcoming election, or training the Iranian police in more effective techniques of coping with anti-government activities.

[4] It may be argued that the threat of aggression, and even aggression itself, may constitute intervention. The U.S. has repeatedly moved military forces into Caribbean states for the sake of altering their internal policies without, however, staying long or taking sovereign title to the countries involved. The question is difficult to decide. The British army "intervened" in Egypt in 1882 and stayed for seventy-four years without taking title to the country. Is it therefore merely to be called "intervention"? This ambiguity illustrates the difficulties of defining the most desperate encounters nations may have, and how readily intervention can shade into the ultimate kind of force.

[5] Rabbi Robert Gordis has suggested that morality is the highest good since, unless it includes honesty and intelligence, it is simply moralism. I do not put it this way because I want to make sure that we explore anew the power and knowledge that have become part of our morality.

[6] Oddly enough, Chamoun had become President in 1952 after helping to overthrow President Khuri—a man who had greatly increased the number of enemies by his attempt to amend the Constitution so that he might serve an additional six-year term.

[7] Our military mobility has much improved since that time.

[8] I have dealt with this issue specifically in relation to "Perspectives on U.S. Policy in Iran," published in the *SAIS Review* (Washington), April 1962. This and the next two paragraphs are largely drawn from that article. A more extended analysis of the politics involved in the revolution of modernization may be found in my studies, *The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), and "The Social Revolution," in *The Developmental Revolution in the Middle East,* edited by William Polk (Washington: The Middle East Institute, 1963).

[9] Mr. Nixon, one of the earliest and strongest advocates of intervention in Cuba, in retrospect perceives only the electoral ironies that arose from his having declared on TV in August 1960, while preparations for the invasion were under way: "We would lose all of our friends in Latin America, we would probably be condemned in the United Nations and we would not accomplish our objectives."

[10] Readers of the *New York Times* and *Time* before, during, and after the Cuban intervention should have no difficulty recalling evidence for this view. We seemed to have lacked adequate knowledge about a country 90 miles from home or at least failed to utilize knowledge that was available; we ruthlessly manipulated men and groups among Cuban exiles; we gave unconcerned support (or pragmatic and instinctive favoritism) to ex-Batista or pre-Batista men, rather than men willing to deal with discontent which Castro had exploited. Had we insisted on the military success of this particularly ill-conceived venture it would have been a moral and political tragedy.

There are also men at CIA who have produced major and imaginative projects in what will be defined below as constructive precautionary intervention. Their successes, by nature, evolve slowly and lack the drama of failure. It is my impression, however, based on inadequate knowledge, that the failures at intervention deserve the greater weight of attention.

[11] *New York Herald-Tribune,* April 9, 1961.

[12] The following quotations illustrate our position. On our right to counter Soviet interventions: "Let the record show that our restraint is not inexhaustible . . . This Government will not hesitate on meeting its primary obligations which are to the security of our Nation." (President Kennedy, "The Lesson of Cuba," *Department of State Bulletin,* 1961, Vol. 44, p. 659.) On the USSR claiming the same rights: "If you consider yourself to be in the right to implement such measures against Cuba which have been lately taken by the U.S.A., you must admit that other countries, also, do not have lesser reason to act in a similar manner in relation to states on whose territories preparations are actually being made which represent a threat against the security of the Soviet Union. If you do not wish to sin against elementary logic, you evidently must admit such a right to other states." (Mr. Khrushchev's Message to President Kennedy, *ibid.,* pp. 664-65.) On escalation: "We are resolved," said Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, "to continue the struggle in all its forms," coping with Soviet long-range ballistic missiles armed with nuclear warheads as well as subversion and indirect warfare, "until such a time as the Communist leaders, both Soviet and Chinese, are convinced that their aggressive policies, motivated by their drive to com-

munize the world, endanger their security as well as ours." (*New York Times,* January 20, 1962.)

[13] Trotsky, *Terrorism and Communism 1920;* (English Translation, *Dictatorship vs. Democracy: A Reply to Karl Kautsky,* New York, Workers' Party of America, 1922, pp. 54; 57-59.)

[14] I am greatly indebted for insights into the relationship of international law to the politics and morality of intervention, and for information, to three articles by Professor Richard A. Falk (Princeton University), namely "The United States and the Doctrine of Non-Intervention in the Internal Affairs of Independent States," *Howard Law Journal,* June 1959, pp. 163-89; "American Intervention in Cuba and the Rule of Law," *Ohio State Law Journal,* Summer 1961, pp. 546-85; and *Law, Morality and War in the Contemporary World* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963).

[15] *The Reporter,* September 14, 1961.

[16] What cannot be used as an effective threat, however, is collective intervention by NATO in the non-European and non-Communist areas of the world. Those who would neglect the UN in favor of NATO do not appreciate the limited usefulness of common action by the white partners of a military alliance in the rest of the world.

[17] It will be noted that I speak only of intervention against elements employing *force* under the duress or discipline of *great* foreign power. Threats from smaller nations can surely be handled in less spectacular ways. In restricting counter-intervention to a reply against force, I should like to reject the other alternative with entire clarity. If, as a result of an inadequate performance by democratic forces in India and the West, for example, Indians turn to Communism in a free election, I would not for a moment regard the forceful reconversion of India into a Western colony as a morally justifiable or politically prudent alternative.

[18] For a discussion of problems of political therapy involved in UN intervention, see Manfred Halpern, "The UN in the Congo," *worldview,* October 1963, pp. 4-8.

[19] For detailed documentation of this point, see my essay on "The Middle East and North Africa," in Cyril E. Black and Thomas P. Thornton (eds.), *Communism and Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964).

[20] Between 1956 and 1958 the USSR several times publicly indicated its interest in such a proposal.

[21] In the realm of intervention, as one insightful member of the Department of State has pointed out, these new rules of the game demand far more skill and prudence than the old. For example, for a great power patently to extend support to any local faction, whether in the government or the opposition, may in this highly nationalist environment turn out to be a Kiss of Death. In a world in which the Soviet bloc has become an alternate source of support and supplies, we may not always be able to afford to let a country which refuses to abide by the conditions of our aid suffer the consequences. But the more moral and more useful course of action has also become clearer: it is no longer enough to pick a strongman and intervene on his behalf. The politics of social change demand intervention in behalf of *programs* relevant to societies already in rapid transformation.

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
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